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The gains from the division of labour and comparative 
advantage 
 







This paper develops a model of international trade based on comparative 
advantage and the division of labour. Comparative advantage in intermediate 
goods determines the extent of the division of labour, while the division of labour 
and comparative advantage in final goods lead to gains from trade. Labour is used 
to produce traded intermediate inputs which are used in the production of traded 
final goods; therefore trade is both inter- and intra-industry in nature. Large 
countries export a smaller share of final goods and a larger share of intermediate 
goods than small countries. These predictions find supportive evidence in the data.  
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1  Introduction 
 
The third paragraph of the first chapter of Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations (Smith, 
1776) contains the famous passage in which he describes the impact of the division of labour 
on productivity in a pin factory. To paraphrase Smith, one worker, working on his own, could 
produce at most 20 pins in a day. Ten workers, dividing up the tasks of producing pins, could 
produce 48,000 pins in a day. Hence, the gain to this group of workers from the division of 
labour in this example is 24,000%. One implication of this is that international trade, by 
enabling greater levels of specialisation, should result in productivity gains.  
 
This paper develops a model of international trade in which the gains from the division of 
labour play a central role. As in Adam Smith’s example, the more the production process can 
be divided into discrete stages, the larger will be the final output. Ricardo’s (1817) 
comparative advantage also plays an important role, by determining the patterns of 
specialisation across countries and pinning down the number of stages in the production 
process. When international trade is allowed, large countries gain more from comparative 
advantage than from the division of labour, while the opposite is true for small countries. In 
the model, countries specialise in different subsets of intermediate goods, then trade both 
intermediate and final goods. Countries will engage in intra-industry trade in intermediate 
goods, as well as inter-industry trade in final goods. Hence the model also develops the 
foundations for a model of intra-industry trade based on perfect competition; see also Davis 
(1995) for a very different formulation.  
 
A key testable prediction of the model is that, provided the gains from the division of labour 
are not too large, country size is positively associated with the share of consumption goods in 
its exports, and is negatively associated with the share of intermediate goods in its exports. 
Using data from the UN Comtrade database, we find some evidence which supports these 
predictions of the model. This work is broadly related to the empirical literature on trade in 
intermediate goods and services. For instance, Miroudot et al (2009) and Sturgeon and 
Memedovic (2010) show that intermediate inputs represent over half of total goods trade, but 




There has been a recent resurgence of interest in models of international trade based on the 
division of labour. A large portion of this literature revolves around models based on external 
scale economies, for instance Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2010) and Ethier and Ruffin 
(2009). Choi and Yu (2003) survey the earlier literature on international trade under external 
scale economies, while Wong (2001) offers an alternative treatment. More closely related to 
the present paper is Chaney and Ossa (2013) who extend the new trade model of Krugman 
(1979) to allow for multiple production stages.  
 
Also closely related to the present paper are Ethier (1979, 1982). The nature of the division of 
labour in this paper is similar to that in Ethier (1979, 1982). The main difference is that here, 
we microfound the division of labour as in Ethier (1982), but the production of intermediate 
inputs is perfectly competitive. Indeed, where Ethier (1982) has two sources of scale 
economies (internal to the firm, and due to the division of labour) and one source of 
comparative advantage (factor endowment differences across countries), in the present paper, 
there are two sources of comparative advantage (between intermediate goods, and between 
final goods), and one source of scale economies (the division of labour).   
 
The next section presents the main features of the model. Section 3 outlines the autarkic 
equilibrium, while Section 4 considers the implications of international trade. Section 5 
discusses the trade patterns that arise in the model and provides some supportive empirical 
evidence. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2 The model  
 
There are two countries, 𝑗 = 𝐻,𝐹 for Home and Foreign. Labour is the only factor of 
production, and the two countries have labour endowments 𝐿𝑗. All markets are perfectly 
competitive. There are two final consumption goods, 1 and 2. Consumer utility is identical 
across countries and takes a CES form:  
𝑈 = 𝐶1𝜃 + 𝐶2𝜃                                         0 < 𝜃 < 1    (1) 
Where 𝐶 denotes consumption of a good. Final goods are produced with intermediate inputs, 
and assembly of final goods is assumed to be costless. Suppose there is a large (infinite) 
number of possible intermediate inputs. Each country produces a number of intermediate 
inputs 𝑛𝑗 , which is assumed to be small relative to the number of possible intermediate 
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inputs. As a result, the intermediate inputs produced in one country are different from those 
produced in the other country. All intermediate inputs are used in fixed proportions. Hence let 
the production functions of the final goods in the two countries be:  
𝑄1𝐻 = 𝛾(𝑛𝐻 + 𝑛𝐹)𝛽+1𝑥      (2) 
𝑄2𝐻 = (𝑛𝐻 + 𝑛𝐹)𝛽+1𝑥      (3) 
𝑄1𝐹 = (𝑛𝐻 + 𝑛𝐹)𝛽+1𝑥     (4) 
𝑄2𝐹 = 𝛾(𝑛𝐻 + 𝑛𝐹)𝛽+1𝑥       (5) 
Output of each final good depends on the number of Home and Foreign produced inputs, 𝑛𝐻 
and 𝑛𝐹, and the quantity of each intermediate input, 𝑥, which is assumed to be the same 
across final goods. 𝛾 > 1 indicates that Home has a comparative technological advantage in 
final good 1, while Foreign has a comparative technological advantage in final good 2. It will 
be shown below that in free trade Home will specialise in good 1 and Foreign in good 2. 
𝛽 > 0 measures the payoff from the division of labour. The larger the number of intermediate 
inputs 𝑛, the greater the division of labour, and the larger the output of the final good, 
analogously to Smith’s pin factory example.  
 
Since all inputs are used in fixed proportions in the production of the final goods, output of 
each intermediate good must also be the same. Each country has a comparative technological 
advantage in a subset 𝑟𝐿𝑗 of intermediate goods, 𝑘𝑗  =  1, … , 𝑟𝐿𝑗. Suppose that these 𝑟𝐿𝑗 
goods are different between the two countries, and let the production technology of 
intermediate inputs be:  
𝑞𝑘𝑗 = 𝑙𝑘𝑗          (6) 
𝑞𝑖 = 𝑞𝑘𝑗 = 𝛼𝑙𝑖 = 𝑙𝑘𝑗                           𝑖 ∉ 𝑘𝑗                           𝛼 < 1   (7) 
That 𝛼 < 1 signifies that the country has a comparative disadvantage in these goods. We 









� < 1, for any 𝑚 > 0.  
 
Assumption 1 holds when 𝛼 and 𝛽 are sufficiently small. Appendix A shows that if 
Assumption 1 holds, we have:  
 




Hence, all the intermediate inputs produced are the ones in which a country has a 
technological advantage in. As a result, the number of intermediate inputs (hence the extent 




Consider first the case where the two countries do not trade with each other. Here we analyse 
the Home country; the solution for the Foreign country is analogous. In this case, Foreign-
produced intermediates are not available for use in the production of Home-produced final 
goods, and all Home-produced intermediates are used at Home, equally split between the two 
final goods, so the production functions in Home are (making use of 𝑛𝑗 = 𝑟𝐿𝑗):  
𝑄1𝐻 = 𝛾𝑛𝐻𝛽+1 �𝑞𝐻2 � = 𝛾(𝑟𝐿𝐻)𝛽+1 �𝑞𝐻2 �     (8) 
𝑄2𝐻 = 𝑛𝐻𝛽+1 �𝑞𝐻2 � = (𝑟𝐿𝐻)𝛽+1 �𝑞𝐻2 �      (9) 
Since all intermediate inputs produced have the same technology, and since output of each 
intermediate good is the same, the labour used in each intermediate input is also the same. 
Hence 𝑞𝑘𝐻 = 𝑙𝑘𝐻 = 𝐿𝐻 𝑛𝐻⁄ = 1 𝑟⁄ . The size of the labour force influences only the number 
of intermediate goods, not the output of each intermediate good. This result of the model is 
similar to Krugman (1980), in which changing labour endowments results in a different 
number of varieties produced, but not the scale of production of each variety2.  
  
Substituting into the production functions (8) and (9) gives:  
𝑄1𝐻 = (𝑟𝐿𝐻)𝛽𝛾 �𝐿𝐻2 �                      𝑄2𝐻 = (𝑟𝐿𝐻)𝛽 �𝐿𝐻2 �    (10) 
Since there is no international trade, Home consumers can only consume Home-produced 
output. Therefore, Home’s consumer’s utility under autarky is:  
𝑈𝐻
𝐴 = (𝑟𝐿𝐻)𝛽𝜃2−𝜃�𝛾𝜃 + 1�      (11) 
Utility is increasing in the size of the Home labour force 𝐿𝐻, the parameter 𝑟 indicating the 
number of comparative advantage sectors, the gain from the division of labour 𝛽, the higher 
                                                          
2 Indeed, another possible way of setting up the model would be to specify the production technology of 
intermediate inputs as in Krugman (1980); as noted in the Introduction, this would yield the model in Ethier 
(1982). The present formulation highlights one additional result of the model, which is that it enables us to 
generate intra-industry trade without recourse to imperfect competition.  
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the degree of substitutability between final goods in consumption 𝜃, and the larger the 
technology parameter 𝛾.  
 
4 International trade 
 
When international trade is allowed, both intermediate inputs and final goods can be freely 
traded across countries. Proposition 2 (proved in Appendix B) shows that both countries are 
always specialised in their comparative advantage final goods in free trade:  
 
Proposition 2: In free trade, Home is specialised in final good 1 and Foreign is specialised in 
final good 2.  
 
Making use of the results in the previous sections and solving for the production functions (2) 
and (5) gives:  
𝑄1𝐻 = 𝑄2𝐹 = � 𝛾2𝑟� (𝑟𝐿𝐻 + 𝑟𝐿𝐹)𝛽+1     (12) 
Production of each final good uses intermediate goods produced in both countries, and 
consumers wish to consume both final goods. If trade in intermediate goods is defined to be 
intra-industry trade, while trade in final goods is inter-industry, then the model predicts both 
inter- and intra-industry trade.  
 
Since preferences are homothetic and identical across countries, each country will consume a 
fraction of the total output of each final good which is proportional to its relative size. Hence, 
the Home consumer’s utility under free trade is:  
𝑈𝐻
𝐹𝑇 = 21−𝜃𝛾𝜃(𝑟𝐿𝐻 + 𝑟𝐿𝐹)𝛽𝜃     (13) 
Define the gains from trade as the ratio between free trade (13) and autarkic utility (11). The 
gains from trade are: 
𝐺𝐻 = 𝑈𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑈𝐻𝐴 = � 2𝛾𝜃𝛾𝜃+1� �𝐿𝐻+𝐿𝐹𝐿𝐻 �𝛽𝜃 > 1     (14) 
Hence there are gains from trade. The following comparative statics results can be shown:  
𝑑𝐺𝐻
𝑑𝐿𝐻
< 0                               𝑑𝐺𝐻
𝑑𝐿𝐹
> 0                               𝑑𝐺𝐻
𝑑𝛽
> 0   (15) 
𝑑𝐺𝐻
𝑑𝛾
> 0                               𝑑𝐺𝐻
𝑑𝜃
> 0       (16) 
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As might be expected, the gains from trade increase the smaller is the country, or the larger is 
the trading partner. The larger the gains from the division of labour 𝛽 or the larger the 
comparative technological advantage in the final good 𝛾, the larger the gains from trade. 
Similarly, the larger the degree of substitutability between final goods 𝜃, the larger the gains 
from trade, since the easier it becomes for consumers to substitute across goods depending on 
price.   
 
The comparative advantage in intermediate goods parameter 𝛼 and the number of 
comparative advantage intermediate sectors 𝑟 do not play a role in the gains from trade. This 
is because, from Assumption 1 and Proposition 1, countries only produce the intermediate 
goods in which they have a comparative advantage, and are equally productive in these 
goods. Instead, the role of comparative advantage in intermediate goods is to determine the 
number of intermediate goods produced in each country; if there is no comparative advantage 
in intermediate goods, the number of intermediate goods produced would be indeterminate. 
Thus the model also presents a new role for comparative advantage in models of international 
trade.  
 
It is possible to decompose the total gains from trade into the component derived from 
comparative advantage in final goods production, the component derived from the division of 
labour, and the component derived from the interaction between comparative advantage and 
the division of labour. To obtain the gains from trade based on comparative advantage alone, 
set 𝛽 = 1 in the gains from trade equation (14) to obtain:  
𝐺𝐶𝐴 = � 2𝛾𝜃𝛾𝜃+1� �𝐿𝐻+𝐿𝐹𝐿𝐻 �𝜃      (17) 
Similarly, set 𝛾 = 1 in equation (14) to obtain the gains from trade based on the division of 
labour alone:  
𝐺𝐷𝐿 = �𝐿𝐻+𝐿𝐹𝐿𝐻 �𝛽𝜃       (18) 
Then, we get:  
𝐺𝐻 = 𝐺𝐶𝐴 × 𝐺𝐷𝐿 × � 𝐿𝐻𝐿𝐻+𝐿𝐹�𝜃      (19) 
Where the last term is the interaction between the gains from comparative advantage and the 
gains from the division of labour; this term is positive but less than 1, suggesting that the total 
gains from trade are less than the combination of the gains from comparative advantage and 
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the gains from the division of labour, or that comparative advantage and the division of 
labour are in some sense substitutes for one another.  
 
It can be shown that:  
𝐺𝐷𝐿 > 𝐺𝐶𝐴                       if                       �𝐿𝐻+𝐿𝐹𝐿𝐻 �(𝛽−1)𝜃 > 2𝛾𝜃𝛾𝜃+1   (20) 
Hence we have:  
 
Proposition 3: The larger is a country relative to its trading partner, the greater the 
importance of comparative advantage relative to the division of labour as a determinant of the 
gains from trade.  
 
Intuitively, as a country becomes larger relative to its trading partner, it gains less from the 
increased division of labour resulting from international trade, and also gains less from the 
fact that its trading partner has a comparative advantage in a different final good. What 
Proposition 3 shows is that the gains from the division of labour decrease more rapidly than 
do the gains from comparative advantage. Hence, the primary source of the gains from trade 
for large countries is comparative advantage, while for small countries it is the division of 
labour.  
 
5 Trade in intermediate and final goods 
 
As noted in Section 2 above, the two countries are symmetric in every way except one: their 
size. Similarly, the two final goods and all intermediate goods are also symmetric in every 
way, and assembly of final goods from intermediate goods is costless. As a result, the total 
value of intermediate goods output is equal to the total value of final goods output, and the 
two final goods are produced in equal quantities and have equal prices. However, with 
homothetic preferences, the larger country will consume a larger fraction of each final good, 
in direct proportion to the country’s size. As a result, if trade is balanced, the share of the 
final good in a country’s exports will be negatively related to the country’s size, while the 
share of intermediate goods will be positively related to the country’s size.  
 





𝑃1𝑄1 = 𝐿𝐹𝐿𝐻+𝐿𝐹 𝑃1 � 𝛾2𝑟� (𝑟𝐿𝐻 + 𝑟𝐿𝐹)𝛽+1 = 12 𝐿𝐹𝑃1𝛾(𝑟𝐿𝐻 + 𝑟𝐿𝐹)𝛽   (21) 
Recall that half of each Home-produced intermediate good is used in the production of final 
good 2, which is produced in Foreign. The value of Home’s exports of intermediate goods is:  
1
2
𝑝𝐻𝑞𝐻𝑛𝐻 = 12 𝑝𝐻𝐿𝐻      (22) 
Hence Home’s exports of the final good as a share of Home’s total exports is:  
𝐿𝐹𝑃1𝛾(𝑟𝐿𝐻+𝑟𝐿𝐹)𝛽
𝐿𝐹𝑃1𝛾(𝑟𝐿𝐻+𝑟𝐿𝐹)𝛽+𝑝𝐻𝐿𝐻      (23) 
Differentiating this expression with respect to 𝐿𝐻 gives the relationship between the share of 




�𝐿𝐹𝑃1𝛾(𝑟𝐿𝐻+𝑟𝐿𝐹)𝛽+𝑝𝐻𝐿𝐻�2     (24) 
The sign of this expression depends on the term {(𝛽 − 1)𝐿𝐻 − 𝐿𝐹}; if this term is negative, 
there will be a negative relationship between country size and its share of final goods exports. 
This will be true provided 𝛽 (the gains from the division of labour) is not too large. Since 
trade is assumed to be balanced, this gives:  
 
Proposition 4: If {(𝛽 − 1)𝐿𝐻 − 𝐿𝐹} < 0, there is a negative relationship between country 
size and the share of final goods in its exports, and a positive relationship between country 
size and the share of intermediate goods in its exports.  
 
We take this prediction of the model to data for all available countries from the UN Comtrade 
database, using data for 2010. We make use of the Broad Economic Categories (BEC) 
classification which divides industries into capital goods, intermediate goods, consumption 
goods, and “unclassified” (see United Nations (2002) for details of the classification). For our 
analysis, we drop the “unclassified” category before calculating the share of each type of 
good in total exports3. Our sample consists of 134 countries, and in the sample, the share of 
consumption goods in total exports is 26.3%, while the share of intermediate goods is 65.6%, 
and the share of capital goods is 8.1%. We obtain GDP in real PPP and real US dollar terms, 
population and land area from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank. Figure 
1 shows a scatterplot of the consumption goods share of total exports and GDP in PPP terms; 
there is a clear negative relationship between the two variables, as predicted by Proposition 4 
(corr = -0.185 with a p-value of 0.037).  
                                                          




Table 1 reports the results of a regression analysis of the relationship between the 
consumption share of exports and country size. Country size is measured using one of the 
four measures above: GDP in real PPP and real US dollar terms, population, and land area, 
all in natural logs. A series of bivariate regressions is reported with these four measures in 
Panel A of Table 1, with heteroskedastic-robust standard errors. All the size measures are 
negatively and significantly related to the consumption share of exports.  
 
It is possible that the relationship between country size and the consumption share of exports 
is different for different groups of countries. Panel B of Table 1 reports results of the same 
regressions, this time including a dummy for the OECD and an interaction term between this 
dummy and the size measure. The OECD dummy and the interaction term are never 
significantly related to the consumption share of exports, and inclusion of these variables 
does not change the negative relationship between country size and the consumption share of 
exports. Finally, Panel C of Table 1 reports results including continent dummies. Once again 
this does not change the negative relationship between country size and the consumption 
share of exports.  
 
Of course, what Table 1 shows is that country size and the consumption share of exports are 
negatively related; it does not imply that one causes the other, or indeed that the model 
proposed in this paper is the “true” explanation for the observed patterns in the data. What it 
does suggest, however, is that the model’s predictions are at least consistent with the 




This paper develops a model of international trade based on the division of labour and 
comparative advantage. The extent of the division of labour is determined by comparative 
advantage in intermediate goods, whereas the gains from international trade arise from the 
division of the production process into increasing numbers of stages and from comparative 
advantage in final goods. It is shown that large countries gain more from comparative 
advantage than from the division of labour, whereas the opposite is true for small countries. 
Trade in this model is both inter- and intra-industry in nature – countries exchange 
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intermediate inputs which are used in the production of final goods, which are then traded 
with each other. Hence the model presented here also provides the foundations for a model of 
intra-industry trade based on perfect competition. In addition, the model predicts that, if the 
gains from the division of labour are not too large, then larger countries will have a smaller 
share of consumption goods in their exports, and a larger share of intermediate goods. These 




Appendix A: When countries always produce 𝒏𝒋 = 𝒓𝑳𝒋 intermediates 
 
This involves comparing the output of the final good that results from producing 𝑛𝑗 = 𝑟𝐿𝑗  
intermediate inputs as in the text, with the output that results from producing fewer or more 
inputs. The proof is shown for good 1 in the Home country in the case of autarky; the proof 
for the other cases follows analogously.  
 
Output when Home produces 𝑛𝐻 = 𝑟𝐿𝐻 intermediate inputs is (as in the text):  
𝑄1𝐻
𝐴 = (𝑟𝐿𝐻)𝛽𝛾 �𝐿𝐻2 �       (A1) 
Output when Home produces 𝑟𝐿𝐻 − 1 intermediate inputs is:  
𝑄1𝐻
𝐴� = (𝑟𝐿𝐻 − 1)𝛽𝛾 �𝐿𝐻2 �       (A2) 
Clearly 𝑄1𝐻𝐴� < 𝑄1𝐻𝐴 , so it is never optimal to produce fewer than 𝑟𝐿𝐻 intermediate inputs.  
 
Output when Home produces 𝑟𝐿𝐻 + 𝑚 intermediate inputs is more complicated, since Home 
has a comparative disadvantage in any intermediate inputs in excess of 𝑟𝐿𝐻. Labour market 
clearing implies 𝐿𝐻 = 𝑟𝐿𝐻𝑙𝑘𝐻 + 𝑚𝛼 𝑙𝑘𝐻, hence:  
𝑄1𝐻
𝐴� = (𝑟𝐿𝐻 + 𝑚)𝛽 �𝛼(𝑟𝐿𝐻+𝑚)𝛼𝑟𝐿𝐻+𝑚 � 𝛾 �𝐿𝐻2 �      (A3) 
Now, 𝑄1𝐻𝐴 > 𝑄1𝐻𝐴�  if �𝑟𝐿𝐻+𝑚𝑟𝐿𝐻 �𝛽 �𝛼(𝑟𝐿𝐻+𝑚)𝛼𝑟𝐿𝐻+𝑚 � < 1, which is stated as Assumption 1 in the text. 






Appendix B: Proof that both countries always specialise in free trade 
 
The proof involves comparing the no-trade relative prices of the final goods in the two 








       (B1) 










𝐴 = 𝛾1−𝜃     (B2) 





𝐹𝑇 = 1       (B3) 














      (B4) 
That is, the free trade relative price always lies strictly between the no-trade relative prices in 
the two countries. Hence profit maximisation by firms will ensure that in free trade the Home 
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Table 1: The relationship between the consumption share of exports and country size. 
Dependent variable = consumption share of exports 
Panel A: Basic regressions    




ln(pop) ln(land area) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Country size -0.017 -0.014 -0.026 -0.025 
 (0.007)** (0.006)** (0.011)** (0.008)*** 
R2 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.09 
N 127 128 134 134 
 
Panel B: OECD dummy 
   
Country size -0.020 -0.018 -0.027 -0.026 
 (0.009)** (0.009)** (0.009)** (0.009)** 
OECD = 1 0.106 0.151 -0.166 -0.147 
 (0.379) (0.343) (0.295) (0.167) 
OECD * Size -0.003 -0.004 0.010 0.011 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.018) (0.013) 
R2 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.09 
N 127 128 134 134 
 
Panel C: Continent dummies 
   
Country size -0.018 -0.017 -0.021 -0.021 
 (0.007)** (0.006)** (0.012)* (0.010)** 
R2 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.12 
N 127 128 134 134 
Notes: Figures in parentheses are heteroskedastic-robust standard errors. *** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 
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